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Abstract
We present an experimental study where we analyze three well-
known matching mechanisms￿ the Boston, the Gale-Shapley, and the
Top Trading Cycles mechanisms￿ in three di⁄erent informational set-
tings. Our experimental results are consistent with the theory, sug-
gesting that the TTC mechanism outperforms both the Boston and
the Gale-Shapley mechanisms in terms of e¢ ciency and it is as suc-
cessful as the Gale-Shapley mechanism regarding the proportion of
truthful preference revelation, whereas manipulation is stronger un-
der the Boston mechanism. In addition, even though agents are much
more likely to revert to truthtelling in lack of information about the
others￿payo⁄s￿ ignorance may be bene￿cial in this context￿ , the
TTC mechanism results less sensitive to the amount of information
that participants hold. These results therefore suggest that the use of
the TTC mechanism in practice is more desirable than of the others.
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11 Introduction
There is now a vast literature on matching problems. Matching is a pervasive
phenomenon arising in several economic and social settings. The assignment
of civil servants to civil service positions, the admission of students to colleges,
some entry-level labor markets￿ as the widely explored market for graduating
physicians￿ , or the school choice problem are among the matching situations
that have gained attention in the last decades. The working of some matching
mechanisms, along with strategic issues that confront individuals in these
contexts, have been explored theoretically.
Very brie￿ y, in a two-sided matching market, agents belong to one of
two disjoint sets, say colleges and students, and each agent￿ college and
student￿ has preferences over the other side of the market￿ students and
colleges, respectively￿ and the prospect of being unmatched. The matching
problem then reduces to assigning students to colleges by means of a match-
ing mechanism. Stability, strategy-proofness, and Pareto e¢ ciency of such
mechanisms are highly valued properties. A mechanism is stable if it always
selects stable matchings; by de￿nition, under a stable matching every agent
in the market prefers his partner to being alone and, moreover, no pair of
agents￿ consisting of a college and a student￿ who are not matched to each
other would rather prefer to be so matched. A mechanism is strategy-proof
if it is immune to preference manipulation, i.e., truth is a dominant strategy.
A mechanism is Pareto e¢ cient if it always selects Pareto e¢ cient matchings.
The perhaps most famous matching mechanism relies on the Gale-Shapley
deferred-acceptance algorithm (Gale and Shapley, 1962). Gale and Shap-
ley were motivated by the problem of the admission of students to colleges
and the Gale-Shapley algorithm was written as a means to show that a
stable matching always exists in such a two-sided matching market. The
Gale-Shapley deferred-acceptance algorithm transforms a matching where
all agents are unmatched into a stable matching, thus proving existence. Be-
sides guaranteeing stability, the Gale-Shapley mechanism has other appealing
properties. Namely, truth is a dominant strategy for one side of the market
(Dubins and Freedman, 1981, Roth, 1982a). Moreover, it is Pareto e¢ cient
when the welfare of both sides of the market is considered (Roth, 1982a).
The strategic properties of the Gale-Shapley mechanism￿ namely the
characterization of dominant strategies and equilibria￿ and, in fact, most
theoretical studies on matching mechanisms rely on the assumption of com-
plete information, however implausible: knowing the true preferences of every
agent in the market is more than we may reasonably expect in most match-
ing markets. Only a few papers have relaxed this assumption and are thus
worth mentioning. Roth (1989) is a ￿rst attempt to deal with the incomplete
2information case. Under incomplete information, even though truth remains
a dominant strategy for one side of the market when the Gale-Shapley mech-
anism is employed, the equilibrium characterization for the complete infor-
mation case is not robust. Ehlers and Mass￿ (2003) study Bayesian Nash
equilibria for mechanisms producing stable matchings￿ as the Gale-Shapley
mechanism￿ and ￿nd a necessary and su¢ cient condition for truthtelling to
be an equilibrium: truthtelling is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in the revela-
tion game induced by a stable mechanism and a common belief if and only if
all pro￿les in its support have a singleton core. Finally, Roth and Rothblum
(1999) and Ehlers (2003, 2004) are less ambitious and do not aim at char-
acterizing equilibria, but give advice to individuals on how to participate in
matching markets when there is uncertainty about the others￿strategies.
Still, many questions regarding the strategic incentives agents face under
incomplete information remain to be answered on theoretical grounds. How
the amount of information held by individuals on the elements of the game
actually in￿ uences individuals￿decision making, a⁄ecting the performance
of matching mechanisms, is thus a question to be explored. For instance,
Barber￿ and Dutta (1995) consider truthtelling as a form of "protective"
behavior, claiming that risk averse agents may revert to faithfully revealing
their true preferences when they are poorly informed. Moreover, it is clear
that in mechanisms for which truth is not a dominant strategy, computing
the optimal strategies requires a lot of information on others￿preferences. In
this paper we present an experimental study to investigate these and other
issues, providing a direction into which the role of information on decision
making may be ascertained.
We investigate a particular class of matching problems: the assignment
of individuals to indivisible items. In these problems, individuals￿ let us call
them teachers￿ have strict preferences over the indivisible items￿ henceforth,
schools￿ and, on the other hand, schools have a maximum capacity and
a strict priority ordering of all teachers. This problem has been referred
to as the school choice problem (Abdulkadiroglu and S￿nmez, 2003) and
is closely related to the college admissions problem explored by Gale and
Shapley (Gale and Shapley, 1962), the main di⁄erence being that, in contrast
to the college admissions model, here schools are not strategic agents, but
mere objects to be assigned to teachers. Hence, while teachers may not
straightforwardly reveal their true preferences, schools have no chance of
manipulating priorities.
The in￿ uence of information is assessed for the Gale-Shapley mechanism
and for another well-known matching mechanism, the Top Trading Cycles
mechanism (TTC), as well as for the Boston mechanism, which has been
3widely used in the context of school choice problems.1 The TTC (Shapley
and Scarf, 1974) ful￿lls two appealing properties: it is both strategy-proof
(Roth, 1982b) and Pareto e¢ cient. The Gale-Shapley mechanism is strategy-
proof, but not e¢ cient (Roth, 1982a), since we only consider teachers￿welfare
in this setup. Finally, we have included the Boston mechanism for reference,
as it fails to meet both requirements: it is neither strategy-proof nor Pareto
e¢ cient. In fact, there is room for pro￿table manipulation of agents￿prefer-
ences under this mechanism and misrepresentation leads to major e¢ ciency
losses.2
Besides providing yet another test of theoretical results on matching
mechanisms with boundedly rational individuals, we address two main ques-
tions. First, we compare the three above mentioned mechanisms under three
informational scenarios, ranging from complete ignorance about the other
participants￿preferences and schools￿priorities to complete information on
all elements of the game. In particular, we are concerned in comparing the
incentives agents face under di⁄erent mechanisms, as well as in comparing
e¢ ciency levels, for di⁄erent information levels. The results in this paper
seem to suggest that the TTC mechanism prevails over the other two in
what e¢ ciency is concerned, even though incentives for truthtelling are not
signi￿cantly di⁄erent from those given by Gale-Shapley. Second, within each
mechanism, we evaluate the in￿ uence of the amount of information held by
individuals on decision making. Namely, we are concerned in testing whether
truthtelling emerges as a very salient form of behavior when information is
low. This would imply that, in markets where we expect agents to know
little about others, strategy-proofness of the mechanism should not drive the
choice of the matching mechanism. Moreover, if we are able to determine that
information signi￿cantly a⁄ects individuals￿behavior, we can immediately
conclude that the existing theoretical results, which rely on the fundamental
assumption of complete information, are insu¢ cient to deal with markets
where agents know little about others. Otherwise, if the e⁄ect of information
is not relevant, theory may be considered apt to deal with the incomplete
information case. Our results support the ￿rst conjecture: information is
actually important. In fact, in a very low information environment, acting
straightforwardly is a very salient form of behavior and signi￿cantly higher
levels of e¢ ciency are achieved under all mechanisms except for TTC, which
1School choice programs have become increasingly popular in the US. The best known
of these programs rely on the Boston mechanism, used to assign students to schools in
Boston, Cambridge, and Seattle, among others.
2On the functioning and strategic properties of the Boston mechanism, check Abdulka-
diroglu and S￿nmez (2003), Abdulkadiroglu et al. (2005), Chen and S￿nmez (2004), and
Ergin and S￿nmez (2004).
4appears to be less sensitive to the amount of information held by participants.
We are aware of several experimental studies of matching problems, some
of which aim at testing the above mentioned mechanisms. These include
Harrison and McCabe (1996) that explores the Gale-Shapley mechanism
and shows that pro￿table manipulation of agents￿preferences becomes more
di¢ cult as markets get larger; Chen and S￿nmez (2002a) that compares a
random serial dictatorship mechanism used to allocate dormitory rooms in
American universities with a variant of the TTC in an incomplete informa-
tion environment, concluding that the TTC produces signi￿cantly more e¢ -
cient allocations; in a companion paper, Chen and S￿nmez (2002b) evaluate
the performance of these mechanisms under complete information, reach-
ing the same qualitative results; ￿nally, Chen and S￿nmez (2004), consider
the school choice problem and analyze the TTC, the Gale-Shapley, and the
Boston mechanisms under incomplete information, concluding that, in what
e¢ ciency is concerned, Gale-Shapley improves upon the TTC, which outper-
forms the Boston mechanism. The di⁄erence between the above studies and
this paper derives from our main objective: to test the role of information in
evaluating matching mechanisms. Other experimental studies, dealing with
other matching mechanisms, are: Olson and Porter (1994), Nalbantian and
Schotter (1995), Kagel and Roth (2000), ￿nver (2001), Haruvy, Roth, and
￿nver (2001), and McKinney, Niederle, and Roth (2005).
We proceed as follows. In Section 2 we present the theoretical properties
of the three matching mechanisms under study. We describe the experi-
mental design in Section 3. Section 4 summarizes the main results of the
experiments. Some concluding remarks follow in Section 5.
2 The Theoretical Model
We ￿rst introduce the model and then describe the three matching mecha-
nisms and their theoretical properties.
In this assignment problem there are a number of teachers to ￿ll a num-
ber of vacancies or teaching positions across di⁄erent schools. Each teacher
has strict preferences over all schools, while each school has a strict priority
ranking of all teachers, as well as a maximum number of teachers to employ.
Priorities are exogenous and not subject to manipulation by schools. The
fact that only teachers can act strategically is what distinguishes this prob-
lem from the college admissions model. It is not di¢ cult to justify the use
of the school choice model. Besides the fact that this model is easier to be
implemented in the laboratory, we can ￿nd plenty of real-life situations that
can be described as one side of the market being inactive. We have already
5mentioned the use of the school choice problem in the admission of children
to public schools in the US, which also applies to other countries as Spain,
but we can also think about the admission of students to universities (which
is, in most countries, based on students￿grades), the MIR system ("MØdicos
Internos Residentes," a residence training system for physicians in public hos-
pitals based on their performance) in Spain, or in general the assignment of
civil servants to civil service positions, which is, in several countries, based on
an objective scoring system (for example teachers, judges, or tax inspectors
in Spain).
The outcome of the school choice problem is a matching, an assignment of
teachers to teaching positions such that each teacher is assigned one vacancy
and each vacancy is ￿lled by one teacher only. A matching is Pareto e¢ cient if
there is no matching that assigns at least one teacher a strictly better school
and every other teacher a weakly better school. A matching mechanism
consists of a systematic procedure that selects a matching for each school
choice problem. A matching mechanism is e¢ cient if it always chooses Pareto
e¢ cient matchings; it is strategy-proof if truth is a dominant strategy, i.e.,
no teacher can pro￿tably manipulate her preferences, independently of the
other agents￿strategies.
2.1 The Top Trading Cycles Mechanism
In this context, the TTC works as follows:
1. Each school gives priority to a number of teachers up to its capacity; in
this setting, for simplicity, each teacher has priority in one school only.
2. Each teacher reports her preferences over the schools.
3. An ordering of teachers is randomly chosen.
4. For any submitted teachers￿preferences, schools￿priorities, and order-
ing of teachers, the outcome is obtained after undergoing the following
steps:
(a) Assign each teacher to a school (tentative assignment); in this
setting, each teacher is tentatively assigned to her priority school.
(b) The ￿rst teacher in the ordering proposes to her top ranked school.
If she has priority at this school, the assignment is ￿nalized and
both the teacher and teaching position are removed from the sys-
tem; the procedure continues with the second teacher in the order-
ing. Otherwise, the ￿rst teacher in the ordering that is tentatively
6assigned to the proposed school is inserted at the top of the or-
dering, in front of the requester.
(c) When the ordering is modi￿ed, this procedure is repeated, so that
the teacher who just became ￿rst in the ordering sends an applica-
tion to her highest-ranked school. If she has priority at this school,
the assignment is ￿nalized and the procedure continues with the
next teacher in line. Otherwise, the ￿rst teacher in the ordering
tentatively assigned to the proposed school is inserted at the top
of the ordering, in front of the requester.
(d) If a cycle forms, it consists of a sequence of proposals of the kind:
A proposes to B￿ s tentative assignment, B applies to C￿ s tentative
assignment, and C proposes to A￿ s tentative assignment. In such
cases, all teachers in the cycle are assigned to the schools they
proposed to and teachers, as well as their respective assignments,
are removed from the system.
(e) The procedure stops when all teachers are assigned to a position.
The TTC mechanism satis￿es two appealing properties: it is strategy-
proof, i.e., truth is a dominant strategy for every teacher, and Pareto e¢ -
cient.3 We thus expect that individuals reveal their preferences in a straight-
forward manner, independently of the amount of information they hold on
the elements of the game.4
2.2 The Gale-Shapley Mechanism
The Gale-Shapley is certainly one of the best known mechanisms in the
matching literature.
Its theoretical properties and the incentives it gives to agents have been
scrutinized and its applications encompass a signi￿cant number of markets.
In what follows we describe the functioning of the Gale-Shapley mechanism:
1. A priority ordering of teachers is determined for each school.
2. Each teacher reports her preferences over the schools.
3. Given the submitted preferences of the teachers and schools￿priority
orderings, positions are allocated after undergoing the following steps:
3Note also that, in this setting, the resulting ￿nal assignment is independent of the
random ordering of teachers de￿ned in step 3.
4Still, Chen and S￿nmez (2002a) ￿nd, in an experiment about on-campus housing, that
about one-third of the subjects manipulate their preferences under a variant of the TTC
mechanism.
7(a) Each teacher proposes to her ￿rst ranked school. Each school
keeps the applicants with higher priority order on hold until po-
sitions are ￿lled, while rejecting the lowest priority teachers in
excess of its capacity.
(b) In general:
Every teacher who got rejected in the previous step proposes to
the next school on her list of preferences. Each school considers
the teachers it holds from the previous step together with the new
applications. The lowest priority teachers in excess of the school￿ s
capacity are rejected, while remaining applications are kept on
hold.
(c) This process is repeated until no applications are rejected. Each
participant is then assigned the position at the school that keeps
her on hold.
As the TTC mechanism, the Gale-Shapley mechanism is strategy-proof.
Again, we expect individuals to faithfully reveal their true preferences over
schools in every informational treatment. This mechanism is e¢ cient when
the welfare of both sides of the market is taken into account. Nevertheless,
in this assignment problem, schools are mere objects to be allocated among
teachers and only teachers￿welfare is taken into consideration. Since there
may exist a matching that Pareto dominates the outcome of the Gale-Shapley
mechanism for teachers, the mechanism is not e¢ cient in this setup. It
follows that, if theory is to be con￿rmed, the TTC should outperform the
Gale-Shapley in e¢ ciency terms.
2.3 The Boston Mechanism
The Boston mechanism has been the most widely used assignment mechanism
in real-life applications of school choice problems. It works as follows:
1. A priority ordering of teachers is determined for each school.
2. Each teacher reports her preferences over the schools.
3. Given the submitted preferences of the teachers and schools￿priority
orderings, positions are allocated after several rounds:
(a) Each teacher proposes to her top ranked school. Each school ac-
cepts the proposals from the teachers with higher priority order
until positions are ￿lled (or no teachers remain who have proposed
8to the school). These applicants and their positions are removed
from the system. All other applications are rejected by the schools.
(b) In general at round k:
Each teacher remaining in the system proposes to its kth school.
Each school with vacant positions accepts the proposals from the
teachers with higher priority order until positions are ￿lled (or no
teachers remain who have proposed to the school in this round).
These applicants and their positions are removed from the system.
All other applications are rejected by the schools.
(c) The procedure terminates when each teacher is assigned a posi-
tion.5
A major handicap of the Boston mechanism is that it leads to preference
manipulation.6 In fact, teachers are given incentives to rank high on their
submitted preferences the schools where they have good chances of getting
in. This has two important consequences. First, evaluating the performance
of this mechanism according to the revealed preferences is clearly inadequate.
Moreover, even though the outcome of the Boston mechanism is Pareto ef-
￿cient when teachers submit their true preferences, preference manipulation
may lead to a substantial e¢ ciency loss. Hence, we expect a low level of
e¢ ciency.
3 Experimental Design
We design our experiments to analyze participants￿decision taking under
di⁄erent informational settings throughout the above described matching
mechanisms: the Boston mechanism, the Gale-Shapley mechanism, and the
TTC mechanism. We use a 3x3 design: for each mechanism we construct
three treatments di⁄ering in the amount of information held by participants
about the elements of the game. This allows us to compare decision making
in nine treatments. In our analysis we concentrate on the role of information
in truthful preference revelation and in e¢ ciency. The environment is de-
signed to capture the key aspects and di¢ culties of each mechanism, under
a controlled environment, with relatively small groups of participants.
Participants are randomly and anonymously sorted into groups of ￿ve.
Each participant plays the role of a teacher to be assigned to a teaching
5Hence, if there are n teachers and l schools, the process ends in a maximum number
of l rounds.
6Chen and S￿nmez (2003) report an experiment where around 80% of the subjects
manipulate their true preferences.
9position. For each group of ￿ve teachers, there are ￿ve vacancies￿ or teaching
positions￿ across three schools that di⁄er in capacity (number of opening
positions) and desirability. Each position should be assigned to one teacher
only. Preferences over schools are induced by the monetary payo⁄ a teacher
obtains depending on the school where she ￿lls a vacancy at the end of the
experiment. The payo⁄s obtained are symmetric: every teacher gets 15e
for her top choice, 9e for the second choice, and 3e for the last choice, but
di⁄erent teachers need not agree on which school is either her top, second,
or last choice. The payo⁄s of di⁄erent outcomes are su¢ ciently dispersed so
as to have a monetarily salient di⁄erence (12e) between getting one￿ s best
and one￿ s worst choice.
New groups are formed for each mechanism by shu› ing all participants
under the "role" of a particular teacher. Participants are informed that
new groups are created for each mechanism. Under each mechanism, each
group of participants plays the game three times, holding three di⁄erent,
but increasing, amounts of information. As a means to avoid participants
from playing from memory when the mechanism is changed, we modify the
labeling of schools and alter the schools￿characteristics accordingly. It follows
that each participant keeps the same preferences over schools throughout the
whole experiment, even though her payo⁄ matrix seemingly changes: the
performed changes are virtual.
Finally, schools have priorities over teachers. This means that schools may
prefer some applicants to others and are able to rank all the participants in
a list of priorities. Moreover, as priorities of schools are given, schools are
not real strategic agents (i.e., they "play" truthfully) and all the participants
know this.
3.1 Informational Settings
In each experimental session three di⁄erent informational treatments are im-
plemented for each mechanism, in the following order:
￿ Zero information setting: In this setting each participant knows
her possible payo⁄amounts depending on the school where she holds a
position (i.e., her own induced preferences), but not the other partic-
ipants￿preferences. She is only told that di⁄erent participants might
have di⁄erent payo⁄ tables.
Participants have no information about the schools￿priority ordering
in this treatment. They are only told the capacity (i.e., the number of
vacancies) of each school.
10￿ Partial information setting: In this setting, besides her own induced
preferences and the capacity of each school, each participant has some
partial information about the schools￿priority orderings. Namely, each
participant is told the favorite candidates of each school, up to its
capacity.
￿ Full information setting: In this informational setting each partic-
ipant has complete information on both the induced preferences of all
participants, and the full priority ordering of schools over candidates.
In the case of the TTC mechanism, as the schools￿priority orderings
are re￿ ected in the tentative assignment, under the "partial information
treatment" participants are told￿ besides their own induced preferences￿
the tentative assignment of all participants; while in the "full information
treatment" they know both the induced preferences of all participants and
the tentative assignment.
We conducted sessions with both undergraduate and graduate students
from the Universitat Aut￿noma de Barcelona, recruited using classroom an-
nouncements and posters in the campus, where the experimental sessions
(on paper/by hand) took place. In total, 30 subjects have participated in
the experiment, which makes six groups of ￿ve. Each subject was allowed to
participate in one session only. Subjects were informed that they would par-
ticipate in a decision making task. At the beginning of each session, subjects
were randomly seated at the tables and printed instructions were given to
them. Before starting each mechanism, the corresponding instructions were
read aloud. In each session and for each informational setting participants
were asked to submit a school ordering, from their top to their last choice.
In each session all nine treatments were implemented, so that we have nine
decisions from each participant, each under a di⁄erent mechanism and/or
di⁄erent informational setting. The order of implementation of the mecha-
nisms and informational settings was the following: 1st: Boston mechanism
in the zero information setting, 2nd: Boston mechanism in the partial infor-
mation setting, 3rd: Boston mechanism in the full information setting; 4th:
Gale-Shapley mechanism in the zero information setting, 5th: Gale-Shapley
mechanism in the partial information setting, 6th: Gale-Shapley mechanism
in the full information setting, 7th: TTC mechanism in the zero information
setting, 8th: TTC mechanism in the partial information setting, and ￿nally
9th: TTC mechanism in the full information setting. Subjects did not get
any feedback about previous decisions or outcomes at any moment of the ex-
periment. At the end of each session, one of the nine treatments was chosen
randomly for payment, matching was determined for the chosen treatment
11and earnings were paid. Sessions lasted about 90 minutes and average net
payments￿ including a 3e show-up fee￿ were around 14e.
The instructions and Decision Sheets in English for the Gale-Shapley
mechanism can be found in the Appendix.7
4 Experimental Results
In this section we present our experimental results. Our main aim is to ex-
amine the importance of the level of information that participants hold in
evaluating the three matching mechanisms. The experimental setting we use
allows us to analyze the role of information in individuals￿decision making
and how this a⁄ects the theoretic characteristics of the mechanisms. The ￿rst
keypoint is related to whether individuals report their preferences truthfully.
We study whether the amount of information given to the participants in￿ u-
ences truthful preference revelation (keeping the mechanism under analysis
￿xed) and, on the other hand, whether under the same informational setting
truthful preference revelation changes with the implemented mechanism. The
second main point is related to e¢ ciency. We compare e¢ ciency levels under
each mechanism across information settings and across di⁄erent mechanisms
for the same information level.
4.1 Truthful Preference Revelation
We ￿rst analyze the two questions related to truthful preference revelation.
Table 1 shows the proportion of participants who played truthfully (regard-
ing induced preferences) and who used three possible kinds of preference
manipulation, in each treatment.
7The instructions for the other mechanisms only di⁄er in the description of the allo-
cation method. The Decision Sheets for players in di⁄erent roles look similar to the ones
shown in the Appendix.
12Info Not. Truth PSB SSB PSB&SSB Other
Zero B0 86.7% - 10% 0% 3.3%
Partial B1 33.3% 36.7% 6.7% 16.7% 6.7%
Full B2 36.7% 43.3% 3.3% 3.3% 13.3%
Zero GS0 80% - 6.7% 0% 13.3%
Partial GS1 60% 30% 0% 3.3% 6.7%
Full GS2 66.7% 10.0% 6.7% 6.7% 10%
Zero T0 96.7% - 3.3% 0% 0%
Partial T1 63.3% 23.3% 10% 3.3% 0%























Table 1: Proportion of truthful play and preference manipulations
We can see that the proportion of players who played truthfully varies
between 33,3% and 96,7%, depending on the treatment being implemented.
Even though the Gale-Shapley and the TTC mechanisms are strategy-proof,
there is some misrepresentation of preferences in these treatments as well,
although its extent depends on the implemented information setting. It is
important to examine who manipulates the preferences and in which man-
ner. We identify three possible ways of preference manipulations. First, a
substantial proportion of the participants has ranked the school where she
has priority higher in the submitted ranking than it would be according
to the induced preferences; this is what we call the "Priority School Bias"
(PSB).8 The second identi￿ed way of manipulating the true preferences is
to underrank the most competitive school (i.e., the school with only one
vacancy); following Chen and S￿nmez (2004) we call this form of behavior
"Small School Bias" (SSB). The third manipulation method (PSB&SSB) is
simply the simultaneous use of both previously described ways.9 We can see
that a relatively small proportion of the participants used any of these two
latter methods, and the most frequently used method is the PSB. Checking
the average payo⁄of the participants that use this method (8.23 euro), we can
8In the case of the zero information setting it does not make sense to check for this kind
of preference manipulation, as participants in these settings have no information about
the priorities of the schools.
9As we have already mentioned, in the case of the zero information setting it does not
make sense to check for the PSB preference manipulation, therefore in these info settings
the PSB&SSB manipulation will be included in the SSB manipulation method.
13infer that PSB is used as a means to ensure their second best payo⁄(9 euro).
This form of behavior can be considered as a kind of risk aversion, since this
manipulation allows the participants to avoid their worst payo⁄ (3 euro).
Although the SSB and the PSB&SSB methods are used less frequently, they
yield a slightly higher payo⁄ to the participants than the previous method.
Now, we would like to analyze whether the quantity of information the
participants hold a⁄ects behavior. To answer to this question, we compare
the proportion of participants playing truthfully in di⁄erent informational
settings under each mechanism.10
Result 1: Under each examined matching mechanism (Boston, Gale-
Shapley, and TTC) the amount of information has a signi￿cant e⁄ect on the
decisions of the participants in what truthtelling is concerned. In particular,
we ￿nd that having no information about the other parties￿preferences results
in a signi￿cantly higher proportion of truthtelling than under any treatment
with additional information.
Statistical evidence: Under each mechanism, the null hypothesis of
equal proportions of truthful preference revelation across the three informa-
tional settings can be rejected at 5% signi￿cance level. In particular, in the
Boston and TTC mechanisms, the null can be rejected at any reasonable
signi￿cance level and in Gale-Shapley at 3.7%.11 As the null hypotheses
are rejected, multiple comparisons are made. The results of the pairwise
comparisons (with the corresponding test statistics of the Quade test12 in
parenthesis) can be found in Table 2:
Mechanism
Null hyp. B0=B1 B0=B2 B1=B2 GS0=GS1 GS0=GS2 GS1=GS2 T0=T1 T0=T2 T1=T2
53.3%* 50%* 3.3% 20%* 13.3%** 7% 33.3%* 33.3%* 0%
(28.8) (34.3) (5.5) (27) (18) (9) (30.5) (32.5) (2)
* Significant at
Ơ





Table 2: Di⁄erences in the proportion of truthtelling across information
settings
10We compare, for each mechanism, three informational settings: B0 vs B1 vs B2; GS0
vs GS1 vs GS2; and T0 vs T1 vs T2.
11The value of the test statistics of the Quade test for k related samples in the Boston
mechanism is 8.661, in Gale-Shapley it is 5.385, and in TTC it is 11.479; while the 0.01
quantile of the F distribution with k1=2 and k2=10 degrees of freedom is 7.56, and the
0.037 quantile is 5.26.
12To learn more about the Quade test used in our analysis, see W.J. Conover (1980).
14From the results of the comparisons we can conclude that under the
Boston and TTC mechanisms the proportion of truthful preference revela-
tion is signi￿cantly higher at 1% signi￿cance level in the zero information
setting than either in the partial or the full information settings (86.7% vs.
33.3% and 36.7% respectively under the Boston mechanism; 96.7% vs. 63.3%
and 63.3% respectively under the TTC mechanism), while there is no signif-
icant di⁄erence in the proportions between the partial and full information
settings. Under the Gale-Shapley mechanism the proportion of truthful pref-
erence revelation is signi￿cantly higher at 1% signi￿cance level in the zero
information setting than in the partial information setting (80% vs. 60%),
but its di⁄erence with the full information setting is only signi￿cant at 10%
(80% vs. 66.7%). Here again there is no signi￿cant di⁄erence in the propor-
tion of straightforward behavior between the partial and the full information
settings.
Result 2: Across mechanisms we ￿nd a signi￿cant di⁄erence in the pro-
portion of truthtelling. In particular, both in the partial and full information
settings, the proportion of truthtelling under the Boston mechanism is lower
than under any of the other mechanisms. In the case of the zero informa-
tion setting, under the TTC mechanism, the proportion of truthful preference
revelation is signi￿cantly higher than under any other mechanism.
Statistical evidence: Under the three informational settings, the null
hypothesis of equal proportions of truthful preference revelation across the
three matching mechanisms can be rejected at 5% signi￿cance level. In par-
ticular, in both the zero and full information settings the null can be rejected
at any reasonable signi￿cance level, while in the partial information setting
it can be rejected at 3.4%.13 As the null hypotheses are rejected, multiple
comparisons are made. The results of the pairwise comparisons can be found
in Table 3:
13The value of the test statistics of the Quade test for k related samples in the zero
information setting is 8.636, in the partial information setting it is 5.526, and in the full
information setting it is 7.986; while the 0.01 quantile of the F distribution with k1=2 and
k2=10 degrees of freedom is 7.56, and the 0.034 quantile is 5.484.
15Info
Null hyp. B0=GS0 T0=B0 T0=GS0 GS1=B1 T1=B1 T1=GS1 GS2=B2 T2=B2 GS2=T2
7% 10%** 16.7%* 26.7%** 30%** 3% 30%* 26.7%* 3%
(12) (18) (30) (24) (30) (6) (31.3) (27.3) (4)
* Significant at
Ơ





Table 3: Pairwise di⁄erences in truthtelling across mechanisms
A signi￿cantly smaller number of participants reveal their preferences
truthfully in the partial and the full information settings under the Boston
mechanism (at 5% signi￿cance level) than under either the Gale-Shapley or
TTC mechanism (in the partial information setting 33% vs. 60% and 63%
respectively; and in the full information setting 37% vs. 67% and 63% re-
spectively), while there is no signi￿cant di⁄erence between the Gale-Shapley
and TTC mechanisms.14 As for the case of the zero information setting, our
results show that under the TTC mechanism the proportion of truthful pref-
erence revelation is signi￿cantly higher (at 5% signi￿cance level) than under
either the Gale-Shapley or the Boston mechanism (97% vs. 80% and 87%),15
while there is no signi￿cant di⁄erence in truthtelling under the Boston and
the Gale-Shapley mechanisms.
As we have seen above, participants manipulate their preferences in order
to increase the chances of getting their top ranked choices, which do not
necessarily coincide with their true top choices. Hence, the more participants
get their reported but not true top choices, the lower the achieved e¢ ciency.
Therefore, it is worth to examine whether under some mechanisms and/or
information settings the participants can get their true top choices.
Result 3: Under each mechanism, in both the partial and full informa-
tion settings, there is a highly signi￿cant di⁄erence between the proportion
of the participants who receive their reported top choice and those who re-
ceive their true top choices. The proportion of subjects who receive their true
top choices is signi￿cantly higher in the zero information setting than in any
other information setting. On the other hand, across mechanisms the TTC
mechanism results more successful in terms of the proportion of participants
who get their true top choices.
14In the case of the full information setting the same result holds already at 1% signi￿-
cance level.
15The di⁄erence of proportions between the TTC and Gale-Shapley mechanisms is sig-
ni￿cant already at the 1% signi￿cance level.
16Statistical evidence: In the zero information setting, under all mech-
anisms, there is no signi￿cant di⁄erence between the proportion of subjects
who get their reported top choices and the ones who get their true top choice.
Using a t-test of proportions, the null hypothesis of equal proportions can
not be rejected at any reasonable signi￿cance level, in favor of the alternative
hypothesis of the percentage of reported top choices being higher than the
percentage of true top choices.16 In the case of the partial and full infor-
mation settings, the same null hypothesis can be rejected at any reasonable
signi￿cance level; therefore in these cases we can conclude that a signi￿-
cantly higher proportion of participants receive their reported top choices
rather than their true top choices.17
On the other hand, under each mechanism there is no signi￿cant di⁄erence
in the proportion of subjects that receive their reported top choices in the
zero, partial, or full informational settings (under the Boston mechanism:
B0: 83.3% vs. B1: 76.7% vs. B2: 80%; under Gale-Shapley: GS0: 66.7% vs.
GS1: 50% vs. GS2: 66.7%; and under TTC: TTC0: 80% vs. TTC1: 80%
vs. TTC2: 83.3%). If we consider the proportion of participants who receive
their true top choices, using again a t-test of proportions we arrive to the
conclusion that the null of equal proportions across information settings can
be rejected. In particular, we ￿nd that under each mechanism a signi￿cantly
higher proportion of participants receive their true top choices in the zero
information setting, than in either the partial or the full information setting,
at 10% signi￿cance level. Examining the proportion of participants who
get their true top choices across mechanisms, we arrive to the conclusion
that both in the partial and in the full information settings, under the TTC
mechanism, a signi￿cantly higher proportion of the participants get their
true top choices than either under the Boston or under the Gale-Shapley
mechanism (at 10% signi￿cance level). In the zero information setting, the
Boston and the TTC mechanisms result signi￿cantly more successful than the
Gale-Shapley mechanism, in the same aspect. The following table contains
16The value of the test statistics in the Boston mechanism is 0.647, in Gale-Shapley it is
1.643, and in TTC it is 0.216; while the 0.01 quantile of the standard normal distribution
is 2.327.
17The relevant proportions are the following:
Mechanism
Info setting B1 B2 GS1 GS2 T1 T2
Reported top choice % 76.7% 80.0% 50.0% 66.7% 80.0% 83.3%
True top choice % 23.3% 40.0% 20.0% 36.7% 50.0% 53.3%
Boston TTC Gale&Shapley
Each di⁄erence between the reported and true top choices in a treatment is signi￿cant,
with a p-value <0.001.
17the di⁄erences between information settings and across mechanisms, and
indicates whether a di⁄erence is statistically signi￿cant.18
Difference B0-B1 B0-B2 B2-B1 GS0-GS1 GS0-GS2 GS2-GS1 T0-T1 T0-T2 T2-T1
Diff. true top choice 53.3%* 36.7%* 16.7%** 30%* 13.3%*** 16.7%** 26.7%* 23.3%* 3.3%
(across info settings) (6.69) (3.91) (1.94) (3.88) (1.33) (2.05) (2.74) (2.38) (0.18)
Difference B0-GS0 B0-T0 T0-GS0 B1-GS1 T1-B1 T1-GS1 B2-GS2 T2-B2 T2-GS2
Diff. true top choice 26.7%* 0% 26.7%* 3.3% 26.7%* 30%* 3.4% 13.3%*** 16.7%**
(across mechanisms) (2.74) (-0.22) (2.74) (0.23) (3.24) (3.88) (0.19) (1.3) (1.7)
* Difference significant at
Ơ
=0.01 ** Difference significant at
Ơ
=0.05 *** Difference significant at
Ơ
=0.1
Table 4: Di⁄erence in the proportion of received true top choices
To summarize our results regarding truthtelling, in lack of any informa-
tion about the other participants￿payo⁄s and preferences agents are much
more likely to revert to truthtelling. This suggests that complete ignorance
can be very convenient in this setting. Still, this does not make the TTC
less desirable: even under complete ignorance, the TTC mechanism clearly
outperforms the other two mechanisms. In the settings where agents have
additional information about the elements of the game, both TTC and the
Gale-Shapley mechanisms result successful in what incentives for playing
truthfully are concerned.
4.2 E¢ ciency
We now investigate the e¢ ciency of the three mechanisms in the di⁄erent
informational scenarios. As we know, there is a strong link between the
behavior regarding truthtelling and e¢ ciency. In fact, even when the mecha-
nism used is Pareto e¢ cient￿ in terms of the revealed preferences￿ strategic
behavior may lead to ine¢ cient allocations.
In calculating e¢ ciency levels we use the following de￿nitions. The e¢ -
ciency of a group of participants is calculated as the ratio of the sum of the
actual earnings of the members of the group and the Pareto-optimal earn-
ings of the group. The e¢ ciency of a treatment is simply the average of
the e¢ ciency of all the groups. Table 5 shows the average e¢ ciency of each
treatment:
18The value of the z-statistic can be found in parenthesis.
18Mechanism
Info setting Zero Partial Full Zero Partial Full Zero Partial Full
Notation B0 B1 B2 GS0 GS1 GS2 T0 T1 T2
Efficiency 92.8% 63.8% 73.9% 82.6% 63.8% 69.6% 98.6% 89.9% 91.3%
Boston Gale&Shapley TTC
Table 5.: Average e¢ ciency of the treatments
As we can notice the average e¢ ciency of the treatments varies between
64% and 99%, depending on both the informational setting and the imple-
mented mechanism. Our ￿rst question regarding e¢ ciency is whether some
informational settings yield higher e¢ ciency levels than others. After this,
we will turn our attention to the e¢ ciency di⁄erences that may arise as a
result of the di⁄erent characteristics of the implemented mechanisms.
Result 4: Under the Boston and Gale-Shapley mechanisms the amount
of information has a signi￿cant e⁄ect on the average e¢ ciency achieved by
participants, while under the TTC mechanism the average e¢ ciency does
not depend on the implemented information setting. In particular, under
the Boston and Gale-Shapley mechanisms, having no information about the
other parties￿preferences results in a signi￿cantly higher average e¢ ciency
than when participants hold partial information. On the other hand, there is
no signi￿cant di⁄erence in the e¢ ciency under any mechanism between the
partial and full information treatments.
Statistical evidence: Under the Boston and Gale-Shapley mechanisms,
the null hypothesis of equal average e¢ ciency across the three informational
settings can be rejected at 5% signi￿cance level. In particular, under the
Boston mechanism, the null can be rejected at any reasonable signi￿cance
level, while under Gale-Shapley at 4.8%.19 As the null hypotheses in these
mechanisms are rejected, multiple comparisons are made. The results of the
pairwise comparisons can be found in Table 6:
19The value of the test statistics of the Quade test for k related samples in the Boston
mechanism is 12.547, in Gale-Shapley it is 4.228; while the 0.01 quantile of the F distrib-
ution with k1=2 and k2=10 degrees of freedom is 7.56, and the 0.048 quantile is 4.228.
19Mechanism
Null hyp. B0=B1 B0=B2 B2=B1 GS0=GS1 GS0=GS2 GS2=GS21
28.99%* 18.84%** 10.14%*** 18.84%** 13% 6%
(34.5) (19.5) (15) (28.25) (11.75) (16.5)
* Significant at
Ơ
=0.01 ** Significant at
Ơ





Table 6: Pairwise di⁄erences in e¢ ciency across information
treatments
From the results of these multiple comparisons we can conclude that un-
der the Boston and the Gale-Shapley mechanisms the average e¢ ciency is
signi￿cantly higher (at 5% signi￿cance level) in the zero information setting
than in the partial information setting (92.8% vs. 73.9% under the Boston
mechanism; and 82.6% vs. 69.6% under the Gale-Shapley mechanism), while
there is no signi￿cant di⁄erence in the proportions between the partial and
full information settings.20 The high e¢ ciency level achieved in the zero in-
formation setting is not very surprising, as in this informational setting the
proportion of truthful preference revelation is also signi￿cantly higher than in
the other ones. In fact, truthtelling pays for the agents and this explains the
high e¢ ciency in these cases. In addition, under the Boston mechanism the
e¢ ciency in the zero information treatment is signi￿cantly higher than in the
full information treatment, while this di⁄erence is not signi￿cant under the
Gale-Shapley mechanism (92.8% vs. 73.9% respectively under the Boston
mechanism; and 82.6% vs. 69.6% respectively under the Gale-Shapley mech-
anism). Under the TTC mechanism the null hypothesis of equal average
e¢ ciency across the three information setting can not be rejected. So, in
this case￿ although there is a signi￿cant di⁄erence in the truthful preference
revelation of the participants￿ there is no signi￿cant di⁄erence in the aver-
age e¢ ciency in the three treatments (98.6% vs. 89.9% vs. 91.3%) at any
reasonable signi￿cance level, although there is a signi￿cant di⁄erence in the
proportion of truthtelling, favoring the zero information setting.21
Result 5: Across mechanisms, we ￿nd a signi￿cant di⁄erence in the
achieved average e¢ ciency. In particular, in every informational setting
20Under the Boston mechanism, the di⁄erence in the average e¢ ciency in the full and
partial information settings is signi￿cant at 10% signi￿cance level, in favor of the full
information treatment.
21The value of the test statistics of the Quade test for k related samples in the TTC
mechanism is 1.953, while the 0.1 quantile of the F distribution with k1=2 and k2=10
degrees of freedom is 2.92.
20the average e¢ ciency under the TTC mechanism is signi￿cantly higher than
under any of the other mechanisms. On the other hand, we ￿nd no signi￿-
cant di⁄erence in average e¢ ciency between the Boston and the Gale-Shapley
mechanisms, in any informational setting.
Statistical evidence: In the three informational settings we can reject
the null hypothesis of equal average e¢ ciency across mechanisms at a signif-
icance level of 5%. In particular, in the case of the full informational setting
we can reject the null at any reasonable signi￿cance level, while in the par-
tial and zero informational settings at an 2.5%.22 As the null hypothesis is
rejected in every informational setting, multiple comparisons are made. The
results of the pairwise comparisons can be found in Table 7:
Info
Null hyp. B0=GS0 T0=B0 T0=GS0 B1=GS1 T1=B1 T1=GS1 B2=GS2 T2=B2 T2=GS2
10.14% 5.8%** 15.94%* 0% 26.1%* 26.1%** 4.35% 17.39%** 21.74%*
(10.5) (19.5) (30) (2) (25) (23) (5) (27.5) (32.5)
* Significant at
Ơ






Table 7: Pairwise di⁄erences in e¢ ciency across mechanisms
In any informational setting, the TTC mechanism is clearly superior (in
terms of e¢ ciency) to any of the other mechanisms. At a signi￿cance level of
5%, the di⁄erence in average e¢ ciency between the TTC mechanism and ei-
ther the Boston or the Gale-Shapley mechanism is signi￿cant. On the other
hand, our data imply that there is no signi￿cant di⁄erence in the average
e¢ ciency between the Boston and the Gale-Shapley mechanisms, in any of
the informational settings; although our former results on truthtelling would
suggest a slightly higher e¢ ciency level under the Gale-Shapley mechanism
(as there truthtelling was signi￿cantly higher than under the Boston mecha-
nism).
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we examine a particular class of matching problems that is
closely related to the college admissions problem: the assignment of individu-
22The value of the test statistics of the Quade test for k related samples in the zero
information setting is 6.205, in the partial information setting it is 6.477, and in the full
information setting it is 7.656; while the 0.01 quantile of the F distribution with k1=2 and
k2=10 degrees of freedom is 7.56, and the 0.025 quantile is 6.17.
21als to indivisible items. We analyze three well-known matching mechanisms￿
the Boston, the Gale-Shapley, and the TTC mechanisms￿ under three dif-
ferent informational settings. Our experimental design allows us to explore
two main questions.
First, we compare individuals￿decision making regarding truthtelling and
e¢ ciency under the three mechanisms, in each informational setting. These
results may serve as a test of the theoretical characterization of the above
mechanisms. Our results show that in the zero information setting, under
the TTC mechanism, a signi￿cantly higher proportion of participants plays
truthfully than under either the Boston or the Gale-Shapley mechanism. In
case the participants have partial or full information about the elements of
the game, under the Boston mechanism a signi￿cantly higher number of par-
ticipants manipulate their preferences than under either the Gale-Shapley or
the TTC mechanism.23 The ￿rst result is specially interesting, as we do not
￿nd a signi￿cant di⁄erence in truthtelling between the Boston and the Gale-
Shapley mechanism, although under the latter mechanism straightforward
behavior is the dominant strategy. Regarding e¢ ciency, the experimental
result is in accordance with the predictions of the theory: in every infor-
mational setting, the TTC mechanism yields a signi￿cantly higher e¢ ciency
level than either the Boston or the Gale-Shapley mechanisms.24
Our second aim is to evaluate the in￿ uence of the amount of information
held by individuals on decision making under the three matching mechanisms.
The experimental results show that if participants have no information about
the others￿preferences they are more likely to play truthfully than when hold-
ing partial or full information. Between the partial and the full information
settings we do not ￿nd a signi￿cant di⁄erence in truthtelling under any of
the mechanisms.25 The amount of information plays a role in the achieved
e¢ ciency level as well. Under the Boston and the Gale-Shapley mechanism
participants reach a higher e¢ ciency level in the zero information setting
than in the partial information one. While under the Boston mechanism the
e¢ ciency in the zero information setting is signi￿cantly higher than in the
full information setting, the same di⁄erence under the Gale-Shapley mech-
anism is not signi￿cant. Under any of these two mechanisms, there is no
signi￿cant di⁄erence between the partial and the full information case. On
23Summarizing, the proportion of truthtelling across mechanisms is the following:
B0=GS0<TTC0; B1<GS1=TTC1; B2<GS2=TTC2.
24Summarizing, the e¢ ciency levels across mechanisms are the following:
B0=GS0<TTC0; B1=GS1<TTC1; B2=GS2<TTC2.
25Summarizing, the proportion of truthtelling across informational settings is the fol-
lowing at ￿=10%:
B0>B1=B2; GS0>GS1=GS2; TTC0>TTC1=TTC2.
22the other hand, under the TTC mechanism, the amount of information does
not have a signi￿cant e⁄ect on the achieved e¢ ciency level.26
Summarizing, we can conclude that the comparison of the mechanisms
suggests the superiority of the TTC mechanism. Although regarding truthful
preference revelation￿ depending on the implemented informational setting￿
it may give similar results to the Gale-Shapley mechanism, in the achieved
e¢ ciency level the TTC mechanism performs clearly better than either the
Boston or the Gale-Shapley mechanisms. Moreover, we ￿nd that the amount
of information plays an important role in participants￿decision making. In
general we can say that if the participants only know their own induced
preferences, i.e., own payo⁄s, they are more likely to play truthfully than
in case of having additional information. This truthful preference revela-
tion results also in a higher e¢ ciency level, except for the TTC mechanism,
where the amount of information has no signi￿cant e⁄ect on the achieved




A.1 General Instructions (for all three mechanisms)
Thank you for participating in this experiment. The aim of this session is to
study how people make decisions in given situations. From now on till the
end of the session any communication with other participants is forbidden.
If you have any question, feel free to ask at any point of the experiment.
Please do so by raising your hand and one of us will come to your desk to
answer your question.
In this experiment we simulate three di⁄erent mechanisms to allocate job
candidates at workplaces (e.g. teachers at schools). The mechanisms, pay-
ment rules, and teacher allocation method are described in the corresponding
instructions.
You will play each mechanism three times, but under di⁄erent infor-
mational conditions, which will be described in the corresponding Decision
Sheet. Once all the informational treatments are completed for a mechanism,
we will read the instructions for the new mechanism aloud.
26Summarizing, the e¢ ciency levels across informational settings are the following:
B0>B2=B1; GS0>GS1 and GS0=GS2 and GS1=GS2; TTC0=TTC2=TTC1.
23A.1.1 Groups and Roles:
There are 5 participants in a group. The participants with whom you are
grouped will be the same during one mechanism, but might vary with the
change of mechanism.
In the simulation, 5 teaching positions are available across 3 schools. Each
position should be allocated to a participant. Schools di⁄er in size, location
and quality of instructions. As the capacity of each school varies over the
mechanisms, about this you will get the relevant information in the speci￿c
instructions, and in the Decision Sheet. The desirability of schools in terms
of location and quality are summarized in the amounts shown in the payo⁄
table (see Decision Sheets), that contains the payo⁄ amounts corresponding
to each school position. The size of this matrix depends on the informa-
tional treatment you are, as you will notice during the experiment. Di⁄erent
participants may have di⁄erent payo⁄ tables!
A.1.2 Submitted School Ranking:
During the experiment you will be asked to complete the Decision Sheet by
indicating your preference ordering over schools. Note that the preference or-
dering submitted on the Decision Sheet does not necessarily need to coincide
with the one generated by the payo⁄ matrix.
A.1.3 Preference Ordering of Schools:
Schools also have preferences over applicants. This means, that each school
may prefer some candidates to others, and on this basis puts all candidates
in a preference order. This order may be di⁄erent for the di⁄erent schools.
About the preferences of the schools in each informational setting you will
have di⁄erent information in the corresponding Decision Sheet.
A.1.4 Payo⁄s:
During the session you can earn money. You will receive 3C = for your par-
ticipation, in addition to the amount that you earn in a randomly chosen
treatment. This amount is the one of the payo⁄ matrix, corresponding to
the position you hold at the end of the chosen treatment.
Note, that the position you hold at the end of the experiment depends on
your submitted ordering, and the submitted ordering of the other participants
of your group.
Once the experiment has ￿nished, the allocations for all completed mech-
anisms are determined, each participant will get paid her total payo⁄.
24A.2 Instructions for the Gale and Shapley Mechanism
A.2.1 Procedure:
In this mechanism there is one position opening at schools A, and two at
schools B and C.
During the experiment, each participant completes the Decision Sheet
by indicating her school preferences. You have to rank all three schools.
Note that the preference ordering submitted on the Decision Sheet does not
necessarily need to coincide with the one generated by the payo⁄ matrix.
After all participants have completed their Decision Sheets, the experi-
menter will collect the Sheets and distribute the ones for the next environ-
ment, under the same mechanism. Once a mechanism is completed, so all
the informational environments are completed, the experimenter will read
the instructions for the new mechanism aloud.
A.2.2 Allocation Method:
With this method, each participant is assigned a position at the best possible
school reported in her Decision Sheet that is consistent with the priority order
of schools.
Given the submitted preferences of the participants and the priority order
of each school, positions are allocated in the following way:
￿ An application to the ￿rst ranked school in the Decision Sheet is sent
for each participant.
￿ Each school accepts the applicants with higher priority order until posi-
tions are ￿lled, and keep them on hold, while rejects the lowest priority
ones in excess of its capacity.
Throughout the allocation process, a school can hold no more applica-
tions than its number of positions!
￿ Whenever an applicant is rejected at a school, her application is sent
to the next highest school on his Decision Sheet.
￿ Whenever a school receives a new application (from an applicant that
has been rejected in a previous round by a better ranked school), these
applications are considered together with the (previously) retained ap-
plications for that school. Among the retained and new applicants,
the lowest priority ones in excess of the number of the positions are
rejected, while remaining applications are retained.
25￿ This process is repeated until no more applications can be rejected, and
the allocation is ￿nalized; and each participant is assigned the position
at the school that holds her application at the end of the process.
A.2.3 An Example:
We will go through a simple example to illustrate how the allocation method
works.
Applicants and schools: In this example there are four applicants (1-4)
and three schools (A, B, C).
Positions: There are two positions at school B, and one each at A and
C.
Submitted school ranking: Suppose, you know the submitted school
ranking of each participant, and these are the following:
Applicant #1 Applicant #2 Applicant #3 Applicant #4
1st choice A B C C
2nd choice C A B A
3rd choice B C A B
Schools￿priority ordering: Suppose, you know the priority ordering
of the schools:
A B C
1st choice 2 1 1
2nd choice 4 2 3
3rd choice 1 4 4
4th choice 3 3 2
Allocation: This allocation method consists of the following rounds:
ROUND 1: Each applicant applies to her ￿rst choice:
￿ Applicant #1 applies to School A, #2 to School B, and Applicant #3
and #4 to School C.
￿ School A retains Applicant #1, School B retains Applicant #2; and
School C retains Applicant #3;
￿ School C rejects Applicant #4, as it only has one position, and School
C prefers Applicant #3 to #4.
26ROUND 2: The applicant who is rejected in ROUND 1 (#4) applies
to her second choice:
￿ Applicant #4 applies to School A.
￿ School A compares Applicant #1 (retained in round 1) and #4, as it
only has one position free; and retains #4 and rejects now #1 (as in
School A￿ s preference ordering #4 has priority over #1).
ROUND 3: The applicant who is rejected in ROUND 2 (#1) applies
to her second choice:
￿ Applicant #1 applies to School C.
￿ School C compares Applicant #3 (retained in round 1) and #1, as it
only has one position free. School C retains #1 and rejects now #3 (as
in School C￿ s preference ordering #1 has priority over #3).
ROUND 4: The applicant who is rejected in ROUND 3 (#3) applies
to her second choice:
￿ Applicant #3 applies to School B.
￿ School B retains Applicant #2 since the ￿rst round, but still has a
vacancy (as here there are two positions opening), therefore School B
accepts Applicant #3. Here the process ￿nishes, as there are no more
rejections; and the ￿nal allocations are:
Applicant #1 #2 #3 #4
School C B B A
You will have 15 minutes to go over the instructions at your place, and
make your decision. Are there any questions?
A.3 Instructions for the TTC Mechanism27
(...)
27In this Appendix we only include those parts of the original instructions that di⁄er
from the instructions of the Gale-Shapley mechanism.
27A.3.1 Allocation Method:
￿ In this process, initially each participant is tentatively assigned to one
of the opening positions.
￿ In order to determine mutually bene￿ciary exchanges between appli-
cants, all participants are ordered in a queue based on a fair lottery.
This means, that each participant has an equal chance of being ￿rst in
the queue, second, ..., as well as the last in the queue. To determine
this fair lottery, a participant will be asked to draw 5 pieces of papers,
one at a time. Each piece of paper has a number on it, corresponding
to a participant ID. The sequence of the draw determines the order in
the lottery.
￿ Given the submitted preferences of the participants and the order in the
queue determined by the lottery, the allocation process is the following:
￿An application to the ￿rst ranked school in the Decision Sheet is
sent for the participant at the top of the queue.
￿ If the application is submitted to the school to which this par-
ticipant was assigned initially, then her tentative assignment
gets her ￿nal position; and this participant and his position
are removed from the subsequent process. The process con-
tinues with the next participant in the queue.
￿ If the application is submitted to another school, say school
S, then the ￿rst participant who tentatively holds a position
at school S is moved to the top of the queue, directly in front
of the requester.
￿Whenever the queue is modi￿ed, the process continues in the
above described way. Now an application to the ￿rst ranked school
in the Decision Sheet is sent for the (new) participant at the top
of the queue.
￿ If the application is submitted to the school to which this
participant was assigned initially, etc...
￿ If the application is submitted to another school, etc...
￿A mutually-bene￿cial exchange is obtained when a cycle of appli-
cations are made in sequence, which bene￿ts all a⁄ected partici-
pants; e.g. A applies to B￿ s tentative position, B applies to C￿ s
tentative position, and C applies for A￿ s tentative position. In this
case the exchange is completed and all three participants as well
as their assignments are removed from the subsequent process.
28￿The process continues, till all participants are assigned a position.
A.3.2 An Example
(...)
Priority queue of applicants: Suppose, the lottery gave the following
priority ordering: 1 ￿2 ￿3 ￿4.
Tentative assignment: Suppose, the initial (tentative) assignment of
positions is the following:
Applicant #1 Applicant #2 Applicant #3 Applicant #4
B C B A
Allocation: The allocation method consists of the following process:
1. The ￿rst applicant in the queue (#1) applies to her best choice, to
School A, however, the only position here is tentatively held by partic-
ipant #4. So participant #4 is moved to the top of the queue.
2. The new queue is now 4 ￿1 ￿2 ￿3. Participant #4 ranked School C as
her top choice, but the only position in this school is tentatively held
by participant #2. Therefore #2 is moved to the top of the queue.
3. The new queue is now 2 - 4 ￿1 ￿3. Participant #2 ranked School B as
her top choice, but the two positions at school B are tentatively held
by participant #1 and #3. As #1 has priority over #3 (as she is in
front of #3 in the queue), participant #1 is moved to the top of the
queue.
4. The new queue is now 1 - 2 - 4 ￿3. Remember, that applicant #1 has
ranked School A as her best choice. A cycle of participants is now made
in sequence in the last three steps: #1 applied to the tentative assign-
ment of #4, #4 applied to the tentative assignment of #2, and #2
applied to the tentative assignment of #1. These mutually bene￿ciary
changes are made: #1 gets the position in School A, #2 gets one of the
two positions in School B, and #4 gets the position in School C. These
participants and their assignments are removed from the process.
5. The only participant left to be assigned is #3. As the only school with
available position is School B, and this position is tentatively assigned
to her, her assignment ￿nishes; and the allocation process ends. The
￿nal allocations are:
29Applicant #1 #2 #3 #4
School A B B C
(...)
A.4 Instructions for the Boston Mechanism28
(...)
A.4.1 Allocation Method:
Given the submitted preferences of the participants and the priority order of
each school, positions are allocated in the following way:
1. (a) An application to the ￿rst ranked school in the Decision Sheet is
sent for each participant.
(b) Each school accepts the participants with higher priority order
until positions are ￿lled. These applicants and their positions are
removed from the system. All other applications are rejected by
the schools.
(a) The applicants remaining in the system send the application to
their second ranked position in the Decision Sheet.
(b) If a school still has available positions remaining from Round 1,
then it accepts the applicant with higher priority order until all
positions are ￿lled. The remaining applications are rejected.
2. Each remaining participant is assigned a position at her last choice.
A.4.2 An Example
(...)
Submitted school ranking: Suppose, you know the school rankings
submitted by each participant, and it is the following:
28In this Appendix we only include those parts of the original instructions that di⁄er
from the instructions of the Gale-Shapley mechanism.
30Applicant #1 Applicant #2 Applicant #3 Applicant #4
1st choice A A A B
2nd choice B C C C
3rd choice C B B A
Schools￿priority ordering: Suppose, you also know the priority or-
dering of the schools:
A B C
1st choice 1 1 2
2nd choice 2 3 3
3rd choice 3 4 4
4th choice 4 2 1
Allocation: This allocation method consists of the following rounds:
ROUND 1: Each applicant applies to her ￿rst choice:
￿ Applicant #1, #2, and #3 apply to School A, Applicant #4 to School
B.
￿ School A accepts Applicant #1 (his ￿rst choice)
￿ School B accepts Applicant #4
Accepted applicants (#1 and #4) and schools without remaining po-
sitions (School A) are removed from the subsequent process.
ROUND 2: Each applicant who is rejected in ROUND 1 (#2 and #3)
applies to her second choice:
￿ Applicant #2, and #3 apply to School C.
￿ School C accepts Applicant #2 (his ￿rst choice)
Accepted applicants (#2) and schools without remaining positions (School
C) are removed from the subsequent process.
ROUND 3: Each remaining applicant who is rejected in the previous
rounds (#3) is assigned her last choice:
￿ Applicant #3 gets the remaining position in School B.
31Based on this method, the ￿nal allocations are:
Applicant #1 #2 #3 #4
School A C B B
A.5 Decision Sheet for GS Mechanism Under the Zero
Information Treatment
You are participant ID ......, in role #1.
Recall: Your payo⁄ amount depends on the school position you hold at
the end of the experiment. Your possible payo⁄ amounts are outlined in the
following table:
Position received at school A B C
Your payoff 15 3 9
This means, that if at the end of the experiment you hold a position:
￿ at school A, you will be paid 15 C =;
￿ at school B, you will be paid 3 C =;
￿ at school C, you will be paid 9 C =.
Recall! Di⁄erent participants might have di⁄erent payo⁄tables. That is,
payo⁄ by school might be di⁄erent for di⁄erent participants.
Recall! The preference ordering submitted on the Decision Sheet does
not necessarily need to coincide with the one generated by the payo⁄matrix.
Recall! There are two positions opening at school B and C, and one at
school A.
Priority ordering of schools: Schools when o⁄ering teaching positions
consider the quality of each applicant and the experience they have; and on
this basis they make a priority ordering of all candidates. In this ￿rst in-
formational environment of the experiment you do not know anything about
this ordering.
Please submit your ranking of the schools (A through C) from your ￿rst
choice to your last choice. Please rank ALL three schools!
321st choice 2nd choice 3rd choice
This is the end of the ￿rst informational environment under mechanism
GS.
After the experimenter collects your Decision Sheet, you will be given
the second Decision Sheet under the same mechanism, but with di⁄erent
information structure.
A.6 Decision Sheet for GS Mechanism Under the Par-
tial Information Treatment
You are participant ID ......, in role #1.
Recall: Your payo⁄ amount depends on the school position you hold at
the end of the experiment. Your possible payo⁄ amounts are outlined in the
following table:
Position received at school A B C
Your payoff 15 3 9
This means, that if at the end of the experiment you hold a position:
￿ at school A, you will be paid 15 C =;
￿ at school B, you will be paid 3 C =;
￿ at school C, you will be paid 9 C =.
Recall! Di⁄erent participants might have di⁄erent payo⁄tables. That is,
payo⁄ by school might be di⁄erent for di⁄erent participants.
Recall! The preference ordering submitted on the Decision Sheet does
not necessarily need to coincide with the one generated by the payo⁄matrix.
Recall! There are two positions opening at school B and C, and one at
school A.
Priority ordering of schools: Schools when o⁄ering teaching positions
consider the quality of each applicant and the experience they have; and on
33this basis they make a priority ordering of all candidates. In this informa-
tional environment from the priority ordering of the schools you know only
the best candidate(s) of each school. These are the following:
￿ at School A participant #5 has priority;
￿ at School B participant #2 and #4 have priority;
￿ at School C participant #1 (you) and #3 have priority
Please submit your ranking of the schools (A through C) from your ￿rst
choice to your last choice. Please rank ALL three schools!
1st choice 2nd choice 3rd choice
This is the end of the second informational environment under mechanism
GS.
After the experimenter collects your Decision Sheet, you will be given the
third Decision Sheet under the same mechanism, but with di⁄erent informa-
tion structure.
A.7 Decision Sheet for GS Mechanism Under the Full
Information Treatment
You are participant ID ......, in role #1.
Recall: Your payo⁄ amount depends on the school position you hold at
the end of the experiment. Your possible payo⁄ amounts are outlined in the
following table:
Position received at school A B C
Payoff of participant #1 (YOU) 15 3 9
Payoff of participant #2 3 9 15
Payoff of participant #3 9 15 3
Payoff of participant #4 9 15 3
Payoff of participant #5 3 15 9
This means, that for example, if at the end of the experiment:
34￿ You hold a position at school A, participant #2 and #3 hold a position
at school B, and participant #4 and #5 hold a position at school C,
the payo⁄s would be the following.
￿ You would be paid 15C =; participant #2 would get 9C =; participant #3
would get 15C =; participant #4 would get 3C =; and participant #5 would
get 9C =.
Recall! The preference ordering submitted on the Decision Sheet does
not necessarily need to coincide with the one generated by the payo⁄matrix.
Recall! There are two positions opening at school B and C, and one at
school A.
Priority ordering of schools: Schools when o⁄ering teaching positions
consider the quality of each applicant and the experience they have; and on
this basis they make a priority ordering of all candidates. In this informa-
tional environment the complete priority ordering of the schools is known by
each participant, and is shown in the following table:
School A School B School C
1st choice #5 #4 #3
2nd choice #4 #2 #1
3rd choice #2 #1 #4
4th choice #3 #5 #5
5th choice #1 #3 #2
Please submit your ranking of the schools (A through C) from your ￿rst
choice to your last choice. Please rank ALL three schools!
1st choice 2nd choice 3rd choice
This is the end of the mechanism GS. After the experimenter collects your
Decision Sheet, you will be given the Decision Sheet for a new mechanism.
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